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Abstract
Trust and reputation systems represent a significant trend in decision support for Internet
mediated service provision. The basic idea is to let parties rate each other, for example
after the completion of a transaction, and use the aggregated ratings about a given party
to derive a trust or reputation score, which can assist other parties in deciding whether or
not to transact with that party in the future. A natural side effect is that it also provides
an incentive for good behaviour, and therefore tends to have a positive effect on market
quality. Reputation systems can be called collaborative sanctioning systems to reflect their
collaborative nature, and are related to collaborative filtering systems. Reputation systems
are already being used in successful commercial online applications. There is also a rapidly
growing literature around trust and reputation systems, but unfortunately this activity is not
very coherent. The purpose of this article is to give an overview of existing and proposed
systems that can be used to derive measures of trust and reputation for Internet transac-
tions, to analyse the current trends and developments in this area, and to propose a research
agenda for trust and reputation systems.
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1 Introduction
Online service provision commonly takes place between parties who have never
transacted with each other before, in an environment where the service consumer
often has insufficient information about the service provider, and about the goods
and services offered. This forces the consumer to accept the “risk of prior perfor-
mance”, i.e. to pay for services and goods before receiving them, which can leave
him in a vulnerable position. The consumer generally has no opportunity to see and
try products, i.e. to “squeeze the oranges”, before he buys. The service provider,
on the other hand, knows exactly what he gets, as long as he is paid in money. The
inefficiencies resulting from this information asymmetry can be mitigated through
trust and reputation. The idea is that even if the consumer can not try the product
or service in advance, he can be confident that it will be what he expects as long as
he trusts the seller. A trusted seller therefore has a significant advantage in case the
product quality can not be verified in advance.
This example shows that trust plays a crucial role in computer mediated trans-
actions and processes. However, it is often hard to assess the trustworthiness of
remote entities, because computerised communication media are increasingly re-
moving us from familiar styles of interaction. Physical encounter and traditional
forms of communication allow people to assess a much wider range of cues related
to trustworthiness than is currently possible through computer mediated communi-
cation. The time and investment it takes to establish a traditional brick-and-mortar
street presence provides some assurance that those who do it are serious players.
This stands in sharp contrast to the relative simplicity and low cost of establishing a
good looking Internet presence which gives little evidence about the solidity of the
organisation behind it. The difficulty of collecting evidence about unknown trans-
action partners makes it hard to distinguish between high and low quality service
providers on the Internet. As a result, the topic of trust in open computer networks
is receiving considerable attention in the academic community and e-commerce
industry.
There is a rapidly growing literature on the theory and applications of trust and
reputation systems, and the main purpose of this document is to provide a survey
of the developments in this area. An earlier brief survey of reputation systems has
been published by Mui et al. (2002) [48]. Overviews of agent transaction systems
are also relevant because they often relate to reputation systems [24,42,37]. There is
considerable confusion around the terminology used to describe these systems, and
we will try to describe proposals and developments using a consistent terminology
in this study. There also seems to be a lack of coherence in this area, as indicated
by the fact that authors often propose new systems from scratch, without trying to
extend and enhance previous proposals.
Sec.2 attempts to define the concepts of trust and reputation, and proposes an
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agenda for research into trust and reputation systems. Sec.3 describes why trust and
reputation systems should be regarded as security mechanisms. Sec.4 describes the
relationship between collaborative filtering systems and reputation systems, where
the latter can also be defined in terms of collaborative sanctioning systems. In Sec.5
we describe different trust classes, of which provision trust is a class of trust that
refers to service provision. Sec.6 describes four categories for reputation and trust
semantics that can be used in trust and reputation systems, Sec.7 describes cen-
tralised and distributed reputation system architectures, and Sec.8 describes some
reputation computation methods, i.e. how ratings are to be computed to derive rep-
utation scores. Sec.9 provides and overview of reputation systems in commercial
and live applications. Sec.10 describes the main problems in reputation systems,
and provides an overview of literature that proposes solutions to these problems.
The study is rounded off with a discussion in Sec.11.
2 Background for Trust and Reputation Systems
2.1 The Notion of Trust
Manifestations of trust are easy to recognise because we experience and rely on
it every day, but at the same time trust is quite challenging to define because it
manifests itself in many different forms. The literature on trust can also be quite
confusing because the term is being used with a variety of meanings [46]. Two
common definitions of trust which we will call reliability trust and decision trust
respectively will be used in this study.
As the name suggest, reliability trust can be interpreted as the reliability of some-
thing or somebody, and the definition by Gambetta (1988) [21] provides an example
of how this can be formulated:
Definition 1 (Reliability Trust) Trust is the subjective probability by which an in-
dividual, A, expects that another individual, B, performs a given action on which
its welfare depends.
This definition includes the concept of dependence on the trusted party, and the
reliability (probability) of the trusted party, as seen by the trusting party.
However, trust can be more complex than Gambetta’s definition indicates. For ex-
ample, Falcone & Castelfranchi (2001) [18] recognise that having high (reliability)
trust in a person in general is not necessarily enough to decide to enter into a situ-
ation of dependence on that person. In [18] they write: “For example it is possible
that the value of the damage per se (in case of failure) is too high to choose a given
decision branch, and this independently either from the probability of the failure
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(even if it is very low) or from the possible payoff (even if it is very high). In other
words, that danger might seem to the agent an intolerable risk.” In order to cap-
ture this broad concept of trust, the following definition inspired by McKnight &
Chervany (1996) [46] can be used.
Definition 2 (Decision Trust) Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to
depend on something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative
security, even though negative consequences are possible.
The relative vagueness of this definition is useful because it makes it the more gen-
eral. It explicitly and implicitly includes aspects of a broad notion of trust which
are dependence on the trusted entity or party, the reliability of the trusted entity or
party, utility in the sense that positive utility will result from a positive outcome,
and negative utility will result from a negative outcome, and finally a certain risk
attitude in the sense that the trusting party is willing to accept the situational risk
resulting from the previous elements. Risk emerges, for example, when the value
at stake in a transaction is high, and the probability of failure is non-negligible (i.e.
reliability < 1). Contextual aspects, such law enforcement, insurance and other
remedies in case something goes wrong, are only implicitly included in the defini-
tion of trust above, but should nevertheless be considered to be part of trust.
There are only a few computational trust models that explicitly take risk into ac-
count [22]. Studies that combine risk and trust include Manchala (1998) [44] and
Jøsang & Lo Presti (2004) [32]. Manchala explicitly avoids expressing measures
of trust directly, and instead develops a model around other elements such as trans-
action values and the transaction history of the trusted party. Jøsang & Lo Presti
distinguish between reliability trust and decision trust, and develops a mathemati-
cal model for decision trust based on more finely grained primitives, such as agent
reliability, utility values, and the risk attitude of the trusting agent.
The difficulty of capturing the notion of trust in formal models in a meaningful way
has led some economists to reject it as a computational concept. The strongest ex-
pression for this view has been given by Williamson (1993) [67] who argues that the
notion of trust should be avoided when modelling economic interactions, because it
adds nothing new, and that well known notions such as reliability, utility and risk are
adequate and sufficient for that purpose. According to Williamson, the only type of
trust that can be meaningful for describing interactions is personal trust. He argues
that personal trust applies to emotional and personal interactions such as love re-
lationships where mutual performance is not always monitored and where failures
are forgiven rather than sanctioned. In that sense, traditional computational models
would be inadequate e.g. because of insufficient data and inadequate sanctioning,
but also because it would be detrimental to the relationships if the involved parties
were to take a computational approach. Non-computation models for trust can be
meaningful for studying such relationships according to Williamson, but develop-
ing such models should be done within the domains of sociology and psychology,
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rather than in economy.
2.2 Reputation and Trust
The concept of reputation is closely linked to that of trustworthiness, but it is evi-
dent that there is a clear and important difference. For the purpose of this study, we
will define reputation according to the Concise Oxford dictionary.
Definition 3 (Reputation) Reputation is what is generally said or believed about
a person’s or thing’s character or standing.
This definition corresponds well with the view of social network researchers [19,45]
that reputation is a quantity derived from the underlying social network which is
globally visible to all members of the network. The difference between trust and
reputation can be illustrated by the following perfectly normal and plausible state-
ments:
(1) “I trust you because of your good reputation.”
(2) “I trust you despite your bad reputation.”
Assuming that the two sentences relate to identical transactions, statement (1) re-
flects that the relying party is aware of the trustee’s reputation, and bases his trust on
that. Statement (2) reflects that the relying party has some private knowledge about
the trustee, e.g. through direct experience or intimate relationship, and that these
factors overrule any reputation that a person might have. This observation reflects
that trust ultimately is a personal and subjective phenomenon that that is based on
various factors or evidence, and that some of those carry more weight than others.
Personal experience typically carries more weight than second hand trust referrals
or reputation, but in the absence of personal experience, trust often has to be based
on referrals from others.
Reputation can be considered as a collective measure of trustworthiness (in the
sense of reliability) based on the referrals or ratings from members in a commu-
nity. An individual’s subjective trust can be derived from a combination of received
referrals and personal experience. In order to avoid dependence and loops it is re-
quired that referrals be based on first hand experience only, and not on other re-
ferrals. As a consequence, an individual should only give subjective trust referral
when it is based on first hand evidence or when second hand input has been re-
moved from its derivation base [33]. It is possible to abandon this principle for
example when the weight of the trust referral is normalised or divided by the total
number of referrals given by a single entity, and the latter principle is applied in
Google’s PageRank algorithm [52] described in more detail in Sec.9.5 below.
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Reputation can relate to a group or to an individual. A group’s reputation can for
example be modelled as the average of all its members’ individual reputations, or
as the average of how the group is perceived as a whole by external parties. Tadelis’
(2001) [66] study shows that an individual belonging to to a given group will inherit
an a priori reputation based on that group’s reputation. If the group is reputable all
its individual members will a priori be perceived as reputable and vice versa.
2.3 A Research Agenda for Trust and Reputation Systems
There are two fundamental differences between traditional and online environments
regarding how trust and reputation are, and can be, used.
Firstly, as already mentioned, the traditional cues of trust and reputation that we
are used to observe and depend on in the physical world are missing in online envi-
ronments, so that electronic substitutes are needed. Secondly, communicating and
sharing information related to trust and reputation is relatively difficult, and nor-
mally constrained to local communities in the physical world, whereas IT systems
combined with the Internet can be leveraged to design extremely efficient systems
for exchanging and collecting such information on a global scale.
Motivated by this basic observation, the purposes of research in trust and reputation
systems should be to:
a. Find adequate online substitutes for the traditional cues to trust and reputa-
tion that we are used to in the physical world, and identify new information
elements (specific to a particular online application) which are suitable for
deriving measures of trust and reputation.
b. Take advantage of IT and the Internet to create efficient systems for collecting
that information, and for deriving measures of trust and reputation, in order to
support decision making and to improve the quality of online markets.
These simple principles invite rigorous research in order to answer some fundamen-
tal questions: What information elements are most suitable for deriving measures
of trust and reputation in a given application? How can these information elements
be captured and collected? What are the best principles for designing such systems
from a theoretic and from a usability point of view? Can they be made resistant
to attacks of manipulation by strategic agents? How should users include the in-
formation provided by such systems into their decision process? What role can
these systems play in the business model of commercial companies? Do these sys-
tems truly improve the quality of online trade and interactions? These are important
questions that need good answers in order to determine the potential for trust and
reputation systems in online environments.
According to Resnick et al. [56], reputation systems must have the following three
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properties to operate at all:
1. Entities must be long lived, so that with every interaction there is always an
expectation of future interactions.
2. Ratings about current interactions are captured and distributed.
3. Ratings about past interactions must guide decisions about current interac-
tions.
The longevity of agents means, for example, that it should be impossible or diffi-
cult for an agent to change identity or pseudonym for the purpose of erasing the
connection to its past behaviour. The second property depends on the protocol with
which ratings are provided, and this is usually not a problem for centralised sys-
tems, but represents a major challenge for distributed systems. The second property
also depends on the willingness of participants to provide ratings, for which there
must be some form of incentive. The third property depends on the usability of rep-
utation system, and how people and systems respond to it, and this is reflected in
the commercial and live reputation systems described in Sec.9, but only to a small
extent in the theoretic proposals described in Sec.8 and Sec.10.
The basic principles of reputation systems are relatively easy to describe (see Sec.7
and Sec.8). However, because the notion of trust itself is vague, what constitutes
a trust system is difficult to describe concisely. A method for deriving trust from
a transitive trust path is an element which is normally found in trust systems. The
idea behind trust transitivity is that when Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Claire,
and Bob refers Claire to Alice, then Alice can derive a measure of trust in Claire
based on Bob’s referral combined with her trust in Bob. This is illustrated in fig.1
below.
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Fig. 1. Trust transitivity principle
The type of trust considered in this example is obviously reliability trust (and not
decision trust). In addition there are semantic constraints for the transitive trust
derivation to be valid, i.e. that Alice must trust Bob to recommend Claire for a
particular purpose, and that Bob must trust Claire for that same purpose [33].
The main differences between trust and reputation systems can be described as fol-
lows: Trust systems produce a score that reflects the relying party’s subjective view
of an entity’s trustworthiness, whereas reputation systems produce an entity’s (pub-
lic) reputation score as seen by the whole community. Secondly, transitivity is an
explicit component in trust systems, whereas reputation systems usually only take
transitivity implicitly into account. Finally, trust systems usually take subjective
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and general measures of (reliability) trust as input, whereas information or ratings
about specific (and objective) events, such as transactions, are used as input in rep-
utation systems.
There can of course be trust systems that incorporate elements of reputation sys-
tems and vice versa, so that it is not always clear how a given systems should be
classified. The descriptions of the various trust and reputation systems below must
therefor be seen in light of this.
3 Security and Trust
3.1 Trust and Reputation Systems as Soft Security Mechanisms
In a general sense, the purpose of security mechanisms is to provide protection
against malicious parties. In this sense there is a whole range of security challenges
that are not met by traditional approaches. Traditional security mechanisms will
typically protect resources from malicious users, by restricting access to only au-
thorised users. However, in many situations we have to protect ourselves from those
who offer resources so that the problem in fact is reversed. Information providers
can for example act deceitfully by providing false or misleading information, and
traditional security mechanisms are unable to protect against this type of threat.
Trust and reputation systems on the other hand can provide protection against such
threats. The difference between these two approaches to security was first described
by Rasmussen & Jansson (1996) [53] who used the term hard security for tra-
ditional mechanisms like authentication and access control, and soft security for
what they called social control mechanisms in general, of which trust and reputa-
tion systems are examples.
3.2 Computer Security and Trust
Security mechanisms protect systems and data from being adversely affected by
malicious and non-authorised parties. The effect of this is that those systems and
data can be considered more reliable, and thus more trustworthy. The concepts of
Trusted Systems and Trusted Computing Base have been used in the IT security
jargon (see e.g. Abrams 1995 [3]), but the concept of security assurance level is
more standardised as a measure of security 5 . The assurance level can be interpreted
as a system’s strength to resist malicious attacks, and some organisations require
5 See e.g. the UK CESG at http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ or the Common Criteria Project at
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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systems with high assurance levels for high risk or highly sensitive applications.
In an informal sense, the assurance level expresses a level of public (reliability)
trustworthiness of given system. However, it is evident that additional information,
such as warnings about newly discovered security flaws, can carry more weight
than the assurance level when people form their own subjective trust in the system.
3.3 Communication Security and Trust
Communication security includes encryption of the communication channel and
cryptographic authentication of identities. Authentication provides so-called iden-
tity trust, i.e. a measure of the correctness of a claimed identity over a commu-
nication channel. The term “trust provider” is sometimes used in the industry to
describe CAs 6 and other authentication service providers with the role of provid-
ing the necessary mechanisms and services for verifying and managing identities.
The type of trust that CAs and identity management systems provide is simply
identity trust. In case of chained identity certificates, the derivation of identity trust
is based on trust transitivity, so in that sense these systems can be called identity
trust systems.
However, users are also interested in knowing the reliability of authenticated par-
ties, or the quality of goods and services they provide. This latter type of trust will
be called provision trust in this study, and only trust and reputation systems (i.e.
soft security mechanisms) are useful tools for deriving provision trust.
It can be observed that identity trust is a condition for trusting a party behind the
identity with anything more than a baseline or default provision trust that applies
to all parties in a community. This does not mean that the real world identity of
the principal must be known. An anonymous party, who can be recognised from
interaction to interaction, can also be trusted for the purpose of providing services.
4 Collaborative filtering and Collaborative Sanctioning
Collaborative filtering systems (CF) have similarities with reputation systems in
that both collect ratings from members in a community. However they also have
fundamental differences. The assumptions behind CF systems is that different peo-
ple have different tastes, and rate things differently according to subjective taste. If
two users rate a set of items similarly, they share similar tastes, and are called neigh-
bours in the jargon. This information can be used to recommend items that one
participant likes, to his or her neighbours, and implementations of this technique
6 Certification Authority
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are often called recommender systems. This must not be confused with reputation
systems which are based on the seemingly opposite assumption, namely that all
members in a community should judge the performance of a transaction partner or
the quality of a product or service consistently. In this sense the term “collaborative
sanctioning” (CS) [49] has been used to describe reputation systems, because the
purpose is to sanction poor service providers, with the aim of giving an incentive
for them to provide quality services.
CF takes ratings subject to taste as input, whereas reputation systems take ratings
assumed insensitive to taste as input. People will for example judge data files con-
taining film and music differently depending on their taste, but all users will judge
files containing viruses to be bad. CF systems can be used to select the preferred
files in the former case, and reputation systems can be used to avoid the bad files in
the latter case. There will of course be cases where CF systems identify items that
are invariant to taste, which simply indicates low usefulness of that result for recom-
mendation purposes. Inversely, there will be cases where ratings that are subject to
personal taste are being fed into reputation systems. The latter can cause problems,
because most reputation systems will be unable to distinguish between variations
in service provider performance, and variations in the observer’s taste, potentially
leading to unreliable and misleading reputation scores.
Another important point is that CF systems and reputation systems assume an opti-
mistic and a pessimistic world view respectively. To be specific CF systems assume
all participants to be trustworthy and sincere, i.e. to their job as best they can and
to always report their genuine opinion. Reputation systems, on the other hand, as-
sume that some participants will try to misrepresent the quality of services in order
to make more profit, and to lie or provide misleading ratings in order to achieve
some specific goal. It can be very useful to combine CF and reputation systems,
and Amazon.com described in Sec.9.3.3 does this to a certain extent. Theoretic
schemes include Damiani et al.’s (2002) proposal to separate between provider
reputation and resource reputation in P2P networks [13].
5 Trust Classes
In order to be more specific about trust semantics, we will distinguish between a set
of different trust classes according to Grandison & Sloman’s classification (2000)
[22]. This is illustrated in fig.2 below 7 . The highlighting of provision trust in fig.2
is done to illustrate that it is the focus of the trust and reputation systems described
in this study.
7 Grandison & Sloman use the terms service provision trust, resource access trust, dele-
gation trust, certification trust, and infrastructure trust.
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Trust purposeDelegation Trust
Access Trust
Identity Trust
Context Trust
Provision Trust
Fig. 2. Trust Classes (Grandison & Sloman 2000)
• Provision trust describes the relying party’s trust in a service or resource provider.
It is relevant when the relying party is a user seeking protection from malicious or
unreliable service providers. The Liberty Alliance Project 8 uses the term “busi-
ness trust” [40] to describes mutual trust between companies emerging from con-
tract agreements that regulate interactions between them, and this can be inter-
preted as provision trust. For example when a contract specifies quality require-
ments for the delivery of services, then this business trust would be provision
trust in our terminology.
• Access trust describes trust in principals for the purpose of accessing resources
owned by or under the responsibility of the relying party. This relates to the
access control paradigm which is a central element in computer security. A good
overview of access trust systems can be found in Grandison & Sloman (2000)
[22].
• Delegation trust describes trust in an agent (the delegate) that acts and makes
decision on behalf of the relying party. Grandison & Sloman point out that acting
on one’s behalf can be considered to a special form of service provision.
• Identity trust 9 describes the belief that an agent identity is as claimed. Trust
systems that derive identity trust are typically authentication schemes such as
X.509 and PGP [74]. Identity trust systems have been discussed mostly in the
information security community, and a brief overview and analysis can be found
in Reiter & Stubblebine (1997) [54].
• Context trust 10 describes the extent to which the relying party believes that the
necessary systems and institutions are in place in order to support the transaction
and provide a safety net in case something should go wrong. Factors for this type
of trust can for example be critical infrastructures, insurance, legal system, law
enforcement and stability of society in general.
Trust purpose is an overarching concept that that can be used to express any oper-
ational instantiation of the trust classes mentioned above. In other words, it defines
the specific scope of a give trust relationship. A particular trust purpose can for ex-
ample be “to be a good car mechanic”, which can be grouped under the provision
8 http://www.projectliberty.org/
9 Called “authentication trust” in Liberty Alliance (2003) [40]
10 Called “system trust” in McKnight & Chervany (1996) [46]
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trust class.
Conceptually, identity trust and provision trust can be seen as two layers on top of
each other, where provision trust normally can not exist without identity trust. In
the absence of identity trust, it is only possible to have a baseline provision trust in
an agent or entity.
6 Categories of Trust Semantics
The semantic characteristics of ratings, reputation scores and trust measures are
important in order for participants to be able to interpret those measures. The se-
mantics of measures can be described in terms of a specificity-generality dimension
and a subjectivity-objectivity dimension as illustrated in Table 1 below.
A specific measure means that it relates to a specific trust aspect such as the ability
to deliver on time, whereas a general measure is supposed to represent an average
of all aspects.
A subjective measure means that an agent provides a rating based on subjective
judgement whereas an objective measure means that the rating has been determined
by objectively assessing the trusted party against formal criteria.
Table 1
Classification of trust and reputation measures.
Specific, vector based General, synthesised
Subjective Survey questionnaires eBay, voting
Objective Product tests Synthesised general score from
product tests, D&B rating
• Subjective and specific measures are for example used in survey questionnaires
where people are asked to express their opinion over a range of specific issues. A
typical question could for example be: “How do you see election candidate X’s
ability to handle the economy?” and the possible answers could be on a scale
1 - 5 which could be assumed equivalent to “Disastrous”, “Bad”, “Average”,
“Good” and “Excellent”. Similar questions could be applied to foreign policy,
national security, education and health, so that a person’s answer forms a subjec-
tive vector of his or her trust in candidate X .
• Subjective and general measures are for example used on eBay’s reputation
system which is described in detail in Sec.9.1. An inherent problem with this
type of measure is that it often fails to assign credit or blame to the right aspect
or even the right party. For example, if a shipment of an item bought on eBay
arrives late or is broken, the buyer might give the seller a negative rating, whereas
the post office might have caused the problem.
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A general problem with all subjective measures is that it is difficult to protect
against unfair ratings. Another potential problem is that the act of referring neg-
ative general and subjective trust in an entity can lead to accusations of slander.
This is not so much a problem in reputation systems because the act of rating a
particular transaction negatively is less sensitive than it is to refer negative trust
in an entity in general.
• Objective and specific measures are for example used in technical product tests
where the performance or the quality of the product can be objectively measured.
Washing machines can for example be tested according to energy consumption,
noise, washing program features etc. Another example is to rate the fitness of
commercial companies based on specific financial measures, such as earning,
profit, investment, R&D expenditure etc. An advantage with objective measures
is that the correctness of ratings can be verified by others, or automatically gen-
erated based on automated monitoring of events.
• Objective and general measures can for example be computed based on a vec-
tor of objective and specific measures. In product tests, where a range of specific
characteristics are tested, it is common to derive a general score which can be a
weighted average of the score of each characteristic. Dunn & Bradstreet’s busi-
ness credit rating is an example of a measure that is derived from a vector of
objectively measurable company performance parameters.
7 Reputation Network Architectures
The technical principles for building reputation systems are described in this and
the following section. The network architecture determines how ratings and repu-
tation scores are communicated between participants in a reputation systems. The
two main types are centralised and distributed architectures.
7.1 Centralised Reputation Systems
In centralised reputation systems, information about the performance of a given
participant is collected as ratings from other members in the community who have
had direct experience with that participant. The central authority (reputation cen-
tre) that collects all the ratings typically derives a reputation score for every partici-
pant, and makes all scores publicly available. Participants can then use each other’s
scores, for example, when deciding whether or not to transact with a particular
party. The idea is that transactions with reputable participants are likely to result in
more favourable outcomes than transactions with disreputable participants.
Fig.3 below shows a typical centralised reputation framework, where A and B de-
note transaction partners with a history of transactions in the past, and who consider
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transacting with each other in the present.
Reputation Centre
F
A
D
A
A
B
E
B
C
G
Past transactions
a) Past
Reputation Centre
A B
Potential transaction
b) Present
Ratings
Reputation 
scores
Fig. 3. General framework for a centralised reputation system
After each transaction, the agents provide ratings about each other’s performance
in the transaction. The reputation centre collects ratings from all the agents, and
continuously updates each agent’s reputation score as a function of the received
ratings. Updated reputation scores are provided online for all the agents to see, and
can be used by the agents to decide whether or not to transact with a particular
agent.
The two fundamental aspects of centralised reputation systems are:
1. Centralised communication protocols that allow participants to provide rat-
ings about transaction partners to the central authority, as well as to obtain
reputation scores of potential transaction partners from the central authority.
2. A reputation computation engine used by the central authority to derive repu-
tation scores for each participant, based on received ratings, and possibly also
on other information. This is described in Sec.8 below.
7.2 Distributed Reputation Systems
There are environments where a distributed reputation system, i.e. without any cen-
tralised functions, is better suited than a centralised system. In a distributed system
there is no central location for submitting ratings or obtaining reputation scores of
others. Instead, there can be distributed stores where ratings can be submitted, or
each participant simply records the opinion about each experience with other par-
ties, and provides this information on request from relying parties. A relying party,
who considers transacting with a given target party, must find the distributed stores,
or try to obtain ratings from as many community members as possible who have
had direct experience with that target party. This is illustrated in fig.4 below.
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Fig. 4. General framework for a distributed reputation system
The relying party computes the reputation score based on the received ratings. In
case the relying party has had direct experience with the target party, the experi-
ence from that encounter can be taken into account as private information, possibly
carrying a higher weight than the received ratings.
The two fundamental aspects of distributed reputation systems are:
1. A distributed communication protocol that allows participants to obtain ratings
from other members in the community.
2. A reputation computation method used by each individual agent to derive rep-
utation scores of target parties based on received ratings, and possibly on other
information. This is described in Sec.8 below.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks represent a environment well suited for distributed
reputation management. In P2P networks, every node plays the role of both client
and server, and is therefore sometimes called a servent. This allows the users to
overcome their passive role typical of web navigation, and to engage in an active
role by providing their own resources. There are two phases in the use of P2P net-
works. The first is the search phase, which consists of locating the servent where
the requested resource resides. In some P2P networks, the search phase can rely on
centralised functions. One such example is Napster 11 which has a resource direc-
tory server. In pure P2P networks like Gnutella 12 and Freenet 13 , also the search
phase is distributed. Intermediate architectures also exist, e.g. the FastTrack archi-
tecture which is used in P2P networks like KaZaA 14 , grokster 15 and iMesh 16 . In
FastTrack based P2P networks, there are nodes and supernodes, where the latter
keep tracks of other nodes and supernodes that are logged onto the network, and
thus act as directory servers during the search phase.
11 http://www.napster.com/
12 http://www.gnutella.com
13 http://www.zeropaid.com/freenet
14 http://www.kazaa.com
15 http://www.grokster.com/
16 http://imesh.com
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After the search phase, where the requested resource has been located, comes the
download phase, which consists of transferring the resource from the exporting to
the requesting servent.
P2P networks introduce a range of security threats, as they can be used to spread
malicious software, such as viruses and Trojan horses, and easily bypass firewalls.
There is also evidence that P2P networks suffer from free riding [4]. Reputation
systems are well suited to fight these problems, e.g. by sharing information about
rogue, unreliable or selfish participants. P2P networks are controversial because
they have been used to distribute copyrighted material such as MP3 music files, and
it has been claimed that content poisoning 17 has been used by the music industry
to fight this problem. We do not defend using P2P networks for illegal file sharing,
but it is obvious that reputation systems could be used by distributors of illegal
copyrighted material to protect themselves from poisoning.
Many authors have proposed reputation systems for P2P networks [2,12,13,17,23,35,39].
The purpose of a reputation system in P2P networks is:
1. To determine which servents are most reliable at offering the best quality re-
sources, and
2. To determine which servents provide the most reliable information with regard
to (1).
In a distributed environment, each participant is responsible for collecting and com-
bining ratings from other participants. Because of the distributed environment, it is
often impossible or too costly to obtain ratings resulting from all interactions with
a given agent. Instead the reputation score is based on a subset of ratings, usually
from the relying party’s “neighbourhood”.
8 Reputation Computation Engines
Seen from the relying party’s point of view, trust and reputation scores can be com-
puted based on own experience, on second hand referrals, or on a combination of
both. In the jargon of economic theory, the term private information is used to de-
scribe first hand information resulting from own experience, and public information
is used to describe publicly available second hand information, i.e. information that
can be obtained from third parties.
Reputation systems are typically based on public information in order to reflect the
community’s opinion in general, which is in line with Def.3 of reputation. A party
17 Poisoning music file sharing networks consists of distributing files with legitimate titles
- and put inside them silence or random noise.
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who relies on the reputation score of some remote party, is in fact trusting that party
through trust transitivity [33].
Some systems take both public and private information as input. Private informa-
tion, e.g. resulting from personal experience, is normally considered more reliable
than public information, such as ratings from third parties.
This section describes various principles for computing reputation and trust mea-
sures. Some of the principles are used in commercial applications, whereas others
have been proposed by the academic community.
8.1 Simple Summation or Average of Ratings
The simplest form of computing reputation scores is simply to sum the number
of positive ratings and negative ratings separately, and to keep a total score as the
positive score minus the negative score. This is the principle used in eBay’s rep-
utation forum which is described in detail in [55]. The advantage is that anyone
can understand the principle behind the reputation score, the disadvantage that it is
primitive and therefore gives a poor picture participants’ reputation score although
this is also due to the way rating is provided, see Sec.10.1 and Sec.10.2.
A slightly more advanced scheme proposed in e.g. [63] is to compute the reputation
score as the average of all ratings, and this principle is used in the reputation sys-
tems of numerous commercial web sites, such as Epinions, and Amazon described
in Sec.9.
Advanced models in this category compute a weighted average of all the ratings,
where the rating weight can be determined by factors such as rater trustworthi-
ness/reputation, age of the rating, distance between rating and current score etc.
8.2 Bayesian Systems
Bayesian systems take binary ratings as input (i.e. positive or negative), and are
based on computing reputation scores by statistical updating of beta probability
density functions (PDF). The a posteriori (i.e. the updated) reputation score is com-
puted by combining the a priori (i.e. previous) reputation score with the new rating
[31,49–51,68]. The reputation score can be represented in the form of the beta PDF
parameter tuple (α, β) (where α and β represent the amount of positive and nega-
tive ratings respectively), or in the form of the probability expectation value of the
beta PDF, and optionally accompanied with the variance or a confidence parame-
ter. The advantage of Bayesian systems is that they provide a theoretically sound
basis for computing reputation scores, and the only disadvantage that it might be
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too complex for average persons to understand.
The beta-family of distributions is a continuous family of distribution functions
indexed by the two parameters α and β. The beta PDF denoted by beta(p |α, β)
can be expressed using the gamma function Γ as:
beta(p |α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, α, β > 0 (1)
with the restriction that the probability variable p 6= 0 if α < 1, and p 6= 1 if β < 1.
The probability expectation value of the beta distribution is given by:
E(p) = α/(α + β). (2)
When nothing is known, the a priori distribution is the uniform beta PDF with
α = 1 and β = 1 illustrated in fig.5.a. Then, after observing r positive and s
negative outcomes, the a posteriori distribution is the beta PDF with α = r +1 and
β = s + 1. For example, the beta PDF after observing 7 positive and 1 negative
outcomes is illustrated in fig.5.b.
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Fig. 5. Example beta probability density functions
A PDF of this type expresses the uncertain probability that future interactions will
be positive. The most natural is to define the reputation score as a function of the
expectation value. The probability expectation value of fig.5.b according to Eq.(2)
is E(p) = 0.8. This can be interpreted as saying that the relative frequency of
a positive outcome in the future is somewhat uncertain, and that the most likely
value is 0.8.
8.3 Discrete Trust Models
Humans are often better able to rate performance in the form of discrete verbal
statements, than continuous measures. This is also valid for determining trust mea-
sures, and some authors, including [1,8,9,44], have proposed discrete trust models.
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For example, in the model of Abdul-Rahman & Hailes (2000) [1] trustworthiness
of an agent x can be referred as Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy
and Very Untrustworthy. The relying party can then apply his or her own percep-
tion about the trustworthiness of the referring agent before taking the referral into
account. Look-up tables, with entries for referred trust and referring party down-
grade/upgrade, are used to determine derived trust in x. Whenever the relying party
has had personal experience with x, this can be used to determine referring party
trustworthiness. The assumption is that personal experience reflects x’s real trust-
worthiness and that referrals about x that differ from the personal experience will
indicate whether the referring party underrates or overrates. Referrals from a refer-
ring party who is found to overrate will be downgraded, and vice versa.
The disadvantage of discrete measures is that they do not easily lend themselves to
sound computational principles. Instead, heuristic mechanisms like look-up tables
must be used.
8.4 Belief Models
Belief theory is a framework related to probability theory, but where the sum of
probabilities over all possible outcomes not necessarily add up to 1, and the re-
maining probability is interpreted as uncertainty.
Jøsang (1999,2001) [28,29] has proposed a belief/trust metric called opinion de-
noted by ωAx = (b, d, u, a), which expresses the relying party A’s belief in the truth
of statement x. Here b, d, and u represent belief, disbelief and uncertainty respec-
tively where b, d, u ∈ [0, 1] and b + d + u = 1. The parameter a ∈ [0, 1], which
is called the relative atomicity, represents the base rate probability in the absence
of evidence, and is used for computing an opinion’s probability expectation value
E(ωAx ) = b + au, meaning that a determines how uncertainty shall contribute to
E(ωAx ). When the statement x for example says “David is honest and reliable”,
then the opinion can be interpreted as reliability trust in David. As an example, let
us assume that Alice needs to get her car serviced, and that she asks Bob to recom-
mend a good car mechanic. When Bob recommends David, Alice would like to get
a second opinion, so she asks Claire for her opinion about David. This situation is
illustrated in fig. 6 below.
When trust and trust referrals are expressed as opinions, each transitive trust path
Alice→Bob→David, and Alice→Claire→David can be computed with the dis-
counting operator, where the idea is that the referrals from Bob and Claire are dis-
counted as a function Alice’s trust in Bob and Claire respectively. Finally the two
paths can be combined using the consensus operator. These two operators form
part of Subjective Logic [29], and semantic constraints must be satisfied in order
for the transitive trust derivation to be meaningful [33]. Opinions can be uniquely
19
WUXVW WUXVW
WUXVW WUXVW
UHI
UHI
WUXVW
$OLFH
%RE
&ODLUH
'DYLG
GHULYHG
 




Fig. 6. Deriving trust from parallel transitive chains
mapped to beta PDFs, and this sense the consensus operator is equivalent to the
Bayesian updating described in Sec.8.2. This model is thus both belief-based and
Bayesian.
Yu & Singh (2002) [70] have proposed to use belief theory to represent reputa-
tion scores. In their scheme, two possible outcomes are assumed, namely that an
agent A is trustworthy (TA) or not trustworthy (¬ TA), and separate beliefs are be-
ing kept about whether A is trustworthy or not, denoted by m(TA) and m(¬ TA)
respectively. The reputation score Γ of an agent A is then defined as:
Γ(A) = m(TA)−m(¬ TA) , where m(TA), m(¬ TA) ∈ [0, 1]
and Γ(A) ∈ [−1, 1] .
(3)
Without going into detail, the ratings provided by individual agents are belief mea-
sures determined as a function of A’s past history of behaviours with individual
agents as trustworthy or not trustworthy, using predefined threshold values for
what constitutes trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviour. These belief measures
are then combined using Dempster’s rule 18 , and the resulting beliefs are fed into
Eq.3 to compute the reputation score. Ratings are considered valid if they result
from a transitive trust chain of length less or equal to a predefined limit.
8.5 Fuzzy Models
Trust and reputation can be represented as linguistically fuzzy concepts, where
membership functions describe to what degree an agent can be described as e.g.
trustworthy or not trustworthy. Fuzzy logic provides rules for reasoning with fuzzy
measures of this type. The scheme proposed by Manchala (1988) [44] described
in Sec.2 as well as the REGRET reputation system proposed by Sabater & Sierra
(2001,2002) [59–61] fall in this category. In Sabater & Sierra’s scheme, what they
call individual reputation is derived from private information about a given agent,
18 Dempster’s rule is the classical operator for combining evidence from different sources.
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what they call social reputation is derived from public information about an agent,
and what they call context dependent reputation is derived from contextual infor-
mation.
8.6 Flow Models
Systems that compute trust or reputation by transitive iteration through looped or
arbitrarily long chains can be called flow models.
Some flow models assume a constant trust/reputation weight for the whole com-
munity, and this weight can be distributed among the members of the community.
Participants can only increase their trust/reputation at the cost of others. Google’s
PageRank [52] described in Sec.9.5, the Appleseed algorithm [73] and Advogato’s
reputation scheme [38] described in Sec.9.2 belong to this category. In general,
a participant’s reputation increases as a function of incoming flow, and decreases
as a function of outgoing flow. In the case of Google, many hyperlinks to a web
page contributes to increased PageRank whereas many hyperlinks from a web page
contributes to decreased PageRank for that web page.
Flow models do not always require the sum of the reputation/trust scores to be
constant. One such example is the EigenTrust model [35] which computes agent
trust scores in P2P networks through repeated and iterative multiplication and ag-
gregation of trust scores along transitive chains until the trust scores for all agent
members of the P2P community converge to stable values.
9 Commercial and Live Reputation Systems
This section describes the most well known applications of online reputation sys-
tems. All analysed systems have a centralised network architecture. The computa-
tion is mostly based on the summation or average of ratings, but two systems use
the flow model.
9.1 eBay’s Feedback Forum
eBay 19 is a popular auction site that allows sellers to list items for sale, and buyers
to bid for those items. The so-called Feedback Forum on eBay gives buyer and
seller the opportunity to rate each other (provide feedback in the eBay jargon) as
positive, negative, or neutral (i.e. 1, -1, 0) after completion of a transaction. Buyers
19 http://ebay.com/
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and sellers also have the possibility to leave comments like “Smooth transaction,
thank you!” which are typical in positive case or “Buyers beware!” in the rare
negative case. The Feedback Forum is a centralised reputation system, where eBay
collects all the ratings and computes the scores. The running total reputation score
of each participant is the sum of positive ratings (from unique users) minus the
sum of negative ratings (from unique users). In order to provide information about
a participant’s more recent behaviour, the total of positive, negative and neutral
ratings for the three different time windows i) past six months, ii) past month, and
iii) past 7 days are also displayed.
There are many empirical studies of eBay’s reputation system, see Resnick et al.
(2002) [57] for an overview. In general the observed ratings on eBay are surpris-
ingly positive. Buyers provide ratings about sellers 51.7% of the time, and sellers
provide ratings about buyers 60.6% of the time [55]. Of all ratings provided, less
than 1% is negative, less than 0.5% is neutral and about 99% is positive. It was also
found that there is a high correlation between buyer and seller ratings, suggesting
that there is a degree of reciprocation of positive ratings and retaliation of nega-
tive ratings. This is problematic if obtaining honest and fair ratings is a goal, and a
possible remedy could be to not let sellers rate buyers.
The problem of ballot stuffing, i.e. that ratings can be repeated many times, e.g.
to unfairly boost somebody’s reputation score, seems to be a minor problem on
eBay because participants are only allowed to rate each other after the completion
of a transaction, which is monitored by eBay. It is of course possible to create
fake transactions, but because eBay charges a fee for listing items, there is a cost
associated with this practice. However, unfair ratings for genuine transactions can
not be avoided.
The eBay reputation system is very primitive and can be quite misleading. With so
few negative ratings, a participant with 100 positive and 10 negative ratings should
intuitively appear much less reputable than a participant with 90 positive and no
negatives, but on eBay they would have the same total reputation score. Despite its
drawbacks and primitive nature, the eBay reputation system seems to have a strong
positive impact on eBay as a marketplace. Any system that facilitates interaction
between humans depend on how they respond to it, and people appear to respond
well to the eBay system and its reputation component.
9.2 Expert Sites
Expert sites have a pool of individuals that are willing to answer questions in their
areas of expertise, and the reputation systems on those sites are there to rate the
experts. Depending on the quality of a reply, the person who asked the question can
rate the expert on various aspects of the reply such as clarity and timeliness.
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AllExperts 20 provides a free expert service for the public on the Internet with a
business model based on advertising. The reputation system on AllExperts uses
the aspects: Knowledgeable, Clarity of Response, Timeliness and Politeness where
ratings can be given in the in the interval [1, 10]. The score in each aspect is simply
the numerical average of ratings received. The number of questions an expert has
received is also displayed in addition to a General Prestige score that is simply the
sum of all average ratings an expert has received. Most experts receive ratings close
to 10 on all aspects, so the General Prestige is usually close to 10×the number of
questions received. It is also possible to view charts of ratings over periods from 2
months to 1 year.
AskMe 21 is an expert site for a closed user group of companies and their em-
ployees, and the business model is based on charging a fee for participating in the
AskMe network. Ask Me does not publicly provide any details of how the system
works.
Advogato 22 is a community of open-source programmers. Members rank each
other according to how skilled they perceive each other to be, using Advogato’s
trust scheme 23 , which in essence is a centralised reputation system based on a flow
model. The reputation engine of Advogato computes the reputation flow through
a network where members constitute the nodes and the edges constitute referrals
between nodes. Each member node is assigned a capacity between 800 and 1 de-
pending on the distance from the source node that is owned by Raph Levien who
is the creator of Advogato. The source node has a capacity of 800 and the further
away from the source node, the smaller the capacity. Members can refer each other
with the status of Apprentice (lowest), Journeyer (medium)or Master (highest). A
separate flow graph is computed for each type of referral. A member will get the
highest status for which there is a positive flow to his or her node. For example if
the flow graph of Master referrals and the flow graph of Apprentice referrals both
reach member x then that member will have Master status, but if only the flow graph
of Apprentice referrals reaches member x then that member will have Apprentice
status. The Advogato reputation systems does not have any direct purpose other
than to boost the ego of members, and to be a stimulant for social and professional
networking within the Advogato community.
9.3 Product Review Sites
Product review sites have a pool of individual reviewers who provide information
for consumers for the purpose of making better purchase decisions. The reputation
20 http://www.allexperts.com/
21 http://www.askmecorp.com/
22 http://www.advogato.org/
23 http://www.advogato.org/trust-metric.html
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systems on those sites apply to products as well as to the reviewers themselves.
9.3.1 Epinions
Epinions 24 founded in 1999 is a product and shop review site with a business
model mainly based on so-called cost-per-click online marketing, which means
that Epinions charges product manufacturers and online shops by the number of
clicks consumers generate as a result of reading about their products on Epinions’
web site. Epinions also provides product reviews and ratings to other web sites for
a fee.
Epinions has a pool of members who write product and shop reviews. Anybody
from the public can become a member simply by signing up. The product and shop
reviews written by members consist of prose text and quantitative ratings from 1 to
5 stars for a set of aspects such as Ease of Use, Battery Life etc. in case of prod-
ucts, and Ease of Ordering, Customer Service, On-Time Delivery and Selection in
case of shops. Other members can rate reviews as Not Helpful, Somewhat Helpful,
Helpful, and Very Helpful, and thereby contribute to determining how prominently
the review will be placed, as well as to giving the reviewer a higher status. A mem-
ber can obtain the status Advisor, Top Reviewer or Category Lead (highest) as a
function of the accumulated ratings on all his or her reviews over a period. It takes
considerable reviewing effort to obtain a status above member, and most members
don’t have any status.
Category Leads are selected at the discretion of Epinions staff each quarter based on
nominations from members. Top Reviewers are automatically selected every month
based on how well their reviews are rated, as well as on the Epinions Web of Trust
(see below), where a member can Trust or Block another member. Advisors are
selected in the same way as Top Reviewers, but with a lower threshold for review
ratings. Epinions does not publish the exact thresholds for becoming Top Reviewer
or Advisor, in order to discourage members from trying to manipulate the selection
process.
The Epinions Web of Trust is a simple scheme, whereby members can decide to ei-
ther trust or block another member. A member’s list of trusted members represents
that member’s personal Web of Trust. As already mentioned, the Web of Trust in-
fluences the automated selection of Top Reviewers and Advisors. The number of
members (and their status) who trust a given member, will contribute to that mem-
ber getting a higher status. The number of members (and their status) who block
another member will have a negative impact on that member getting a higher status.
Epinions has an incentive systems for reviewers called the Income Share Pro-
gram, whereby members can earn money. Income Share is automatically deter-
24 http://www.epinions.com/
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mined based on general use of reviews by consumers. Reviewers can potentially
earn as much for helping someone make a buying decision with a positive review,
as for helping someone avoid a purchase with a negative review. This is important
in order not to give an incentive to write biased reviews just for profit. As stated
on the Epinions FAQ pages: “Epinions wants you to be brutally honest in your re-
views, even if it means saying negative things.” The Income Share pool is a portion
of Epinions’ income. The pool is split among all members based on the utility of
their reviews. Authors of more useful reviews earn more than authors of less useful
reviews.
The Income Share formula is not specified in detail in order to discourage attempts
to defraud the system. Highly rated reviews will generate more revenue than poorly
rated reviews, because the former are more prominently placed so that they are
more likely to be read and used by others. Category Leads will normally earn more
than Top Reviewers who in turn will normally earn more than Advisors, because
their reviews per definition are rated and listed in that order.
Providing high quality reviews is Epinions core value proposition to consumers,
and the reputation system is instrumental in achieving that. The reputation system
can be characterised as highly sophisticated because of the revenue based incentive
mechanism. Where other reputation systems on the Internet only provide immate-
rial incentives like status or karma, the Epinions system can provide hard cash.
9.3.2 BizRate
BizRate runs a Customer Certified Merchant scheme whereby consumers who buy
at a BizRate listed store are asked to rate site navigation, selection, prices, shop-
ping options and how satisfied they were with the shopping experience. Consumers
participating in this scheme become registered BizRate members. A Customer Cer-
tificate is granted to a merchant if a sufficient number of surveys over a give period
are positive, and this allows the merchant to display the BizRate Customer Certified
seal of approval on it’s web site. As an incentive to fill out survey forms BizRate,
members get discounts at listed stores. This scheme does not capture the frustrated
customers who give up before they reach the check, and therefore tends to provide
a positive bias of web stores. Thus is understandable from a business perspective,
because it provides an incentive for stores to participate in the Customer Certificate
scheme.
BizRate also runs a product review service similar to Epinions, but which uses a
much simpler reputation system. Members can write product reviews on BizRate,
and anybody can become a member simply by signing up. Users, including non-
members, who browse BizRate for product reviews can vote on reviews as being
helpful, not helpful or off topic, and the reputation systems stops there. Reviews are
ordered according to the ratio of helpful over total votes, where the reviews with the
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highest ratios are listed first. It is also possible to have the reviews sorted by rating,
so that the best reviews are listed first. Reviewers do not get any status and they
can not earn money by writing reviews for BizRate. There is thus less incentive for
writing reviews on BizRate than there is on Epinions, but it is uncertain how this
influences the quality of the reviews. The fact that anybody can sign up to become
a member and write reviews and that anybody including non members can vote on
the helpfulness of reviews makes this reputation scheme highly vulnerable to attack.
A simple attack could consist of writing many positive reviews for a product and
ballot stuff them so that they get presented first and result in a high average score
for that product.
9.3.3 Amazon
Amazon 25 is mainly an online bookstore that allows members to write book re-
views. Amazon’s reputation scheme is quite similar to the one BizRate uses. Any-
body can become a member simply by signing up. Reviews consist of prose text
and a rating in the range 1 to 5 stars. The average of all ratings gives a book its
average rating. Users, including non-members, can vote on reviews as being help-
ful or not helpful. The numbers of helpful as well as the total number of votes are
displayed with each review. The order in which the reviews are listed can be cho-
sen by the user according to criteria such as “newest first”, “most helpful first” or
“highest rating first”.
As a function of the number of helpful votes each reviewer has received, as well as
other parameters not publicly revealed, Amazon determines each reviewer’s rank,
and those reviewers who are among the 1000 highest get assigned the status of Top
1000, Top 500, Top 100, Top 50, Top 10 or #1 Reviewer. Amazon has a system
of Favourite People, where each member can choose other members as favourite
reviewers, and the number of other members who has a specific reviewer listed
as favourite person also influences that reviewer’s rank. Apart from giving some
members status as top reviewers, Amazon does not give any financial incentives.
However there are obviously other financial incentives external to Amazon that can
play an important role. It is for example easy to imagine why publishers would
want to pay people to write good reviews for their books on Amazon.
There are many reports of attacks on the Amazon review scheme where various
types of ballot stuffing has artificially elevated reviewers to top reviewer, or various
types of “bad mouthing” has dethroned top reviewers. This is not surprising due to
the fact that users can vote without becoming a member. For example the Amazon
#1 Reviewer usually is somebody who posts more reviews than any living person
could possibly do if it would require that person to read each book, thus indicating
that the combined effort of a group of people, presented as a single person’s work,
25 http://www.amazon.com/
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is needed to get to the top. Also, reviewers who have reached the Top 100 rank
have reported a sudden increase in negative votes which reflects that there is a cat
fight taking place in order to get into the ranks of top reviewers. In order to reduce
the problem, Amazon only allows one vote per registered cookie for any given
review. However deleting that cookie or switching to another computer will allow
the same user to vote on the same review again. There will always be new types of
attacks, and Amazon needs to be vigilant and respond to new types of attacks as
they emerge. However, due to the vulnerability of the review scheme it can not be
described as a robust scheme.
9.4 Discussion Fora
9.4.1 Slashdot
Slashdot 26 was started in 1997 as a “news for nerds” message board. More pre-
cisely it is a forum for posting articles and comments to articles. In the early days
when the community was small, the signal to noise ratio was very high. As is the
case with all mailing lists and discussion fora where the number of members grow
rapidly, spam and low quality postings emerged to become a major problem, and
this forced Slashdot to introduce moderation. To start with there was a team of
25 moderators which after a while grew to 400 moderators to keep pace with the
growing number of users and the amount of spam that followed. In order to create
a more democratic and healthy moderation scheme, automated moderator selection
was introduced, and the Slashdot reputation system forms an integral part of that
as explained below. The moderation scheme actually consists of two moderation
layers where M1 is for moderating comments to articles, and M2 is for moderating
M1 moderators.
The articles posted on Slashdot are selected at the discretion of the Slashdot staff
based on submissions from the Slashdot community. Once an article has been
posted, anyone can give comments to that article.
Users of Slashdot can be Logged In Users or just anonymous persons browsing the
web. Anybody can become a Logged In User simply by signing up. Reading articles
and comments as well as writing comments to articles can be done anonymously.
Because anybody can write comments, they need to be moderated, and only Logged
In Users are eligible to become moderators.
Regularly (typically every 30 minutes), Slashdot automatically selects a group of
M1 moderators among long time regular Logged In Users, and gives each mod-
erator 3 days to spend a given number of (typically 5) moderation points. Each
moderation point can be spent moderating 1 comment by giving it a rating selected
26 http://slashdot.org/
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from a list of negative ( offtopic, flamebait, troll, redundant, overrated) or positive
(insightful, interesting, informative, funny, underrated) adjectives. An integer score
in the range [-1, 5] is maintained for each comment. The initial score is normally 1
but can also be influenced by the comment provider’s Karma as explained below. A
moderator rating a comment positively causes a 1 point increase in the comment’s
score, and a moderator rating a comment negatively causes a 1 point decrease in
the comment’s score, but within the range [-1, 5].
Each Logged In User maintains a Karma which can take one of the discrete values
Terrible, Bad, Neutral, Positive, Good and Excellent. New Logged In Users start
with neutral Karma. Positive moderation of a user’s comments contributes to higher
Karma whereas a negative moderation of a user’s comments contributes to lower
Karma of that user. Comments by users with very high Karma will get initial score
2 whereas comments by users with very low Karma will get initial score 0 or even
-1. High Karma users will get more moderation points and low Karma users will
get less moderation points to spend when they are selected as moderators.
The purpose of the comment score is to be able to filter the good comments from
the bad and to allow users to set thresholds when reading articles and postings on
Slashdot. A user who only wants to read the best comments can set the threshold to
5 whereas a user who wants to read everything can set the threshold to -1.
To address the issue of unfair moderations, Slashdot has introduced a metamodera-
tion layer called M2, (the moderation layer described above is called M1) with the
purpose of moderating the M1 moderators. Any longstanding Logged In user can
metamoderate several times per day if he or she so wishes. A user who wants to
metamoderate will be asked to moderate the M1 ratings on 10 randomly selected
comment postings. The metamoderator decides if a moderator’s rating was fair, un-
fair, or neither. This moderation affects the Karma of the M1 moderators which in
turn influences their eligibility to become M1 moderators in the future.
The Slashdot reputation system recognises that a moderator’s taste can influence
how he or she rates a comment. Having one set of positive ratings and one set
of negative ratings, each with different types of taste dependent rating choices, is
aimed at solving that problem. The idea is that moderators with different taste can
give different ratings (e.g. insightful or funny) to a comment that has merit, but
every rating will still be uniformly positive. Similarly, moderators with different
taste can give different ratings (e.g. offtopic or overrated) to a comment without
merit, but every rating will still be uniformly negative. Slashdot staff are also able to
spend arbitrary amounts of moderation points making these people omnipotent and
thereby able to manually stabilise the system in case Slashdot would be attacked
by extreme volumes of spam and unfair ratings.
The Slashdot reputation system directs and stimulates the massive collaborative
effort of moderating thousands of postings every day. The system is constantly
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being tuned and modified and can be described as an ongoing experiment in search
for the best practical way to promote quality postings, discourage noise and to make
Slashdot as readable and useful as possible for a large community.
9.4.2 Kuro5in
Kuro5hin 27 is a web site for discussion of technology and culture started in 1999.
It allows members to post articles and comments similarly to Slashdot. The repu-
tation system on Kuro5hin is called Mojo. It underwent major changes in October
2003 because it was unable to effectively counter noise postings from throwaway
accounts, and because attackers rated down comments of targeted members in or-
der to make them lose their reputation scores. Some of the changes introduced in
Mojo to solve these problems include to only let a comment’s score influence a
user’s Mojo (i.e. reputation score) when there are at least six ratings contributing to
it, and to only let one rating count from any single IP address.
It is possible that the problems experienced by Kuro5hin could have been avoided
had they used Slashdot’s principle of only allowing longstanding members to mod-
erate because throwaway accounts would have been less effective as an attack tool.
9.5 Google’s Web Page Ranking System
The early web search engines such as Altavista simply presented every web page
that matched the key words entered by the user, which often resulted in too many
and irrelevant pages being listed in the search results. Altavista’s proposal for han-
dling this problem was to offer advanced ways to combine keywords based on
binary logic. This was too complex for users and therefore did not represent a good
solution.
PageRank proposed by Page et al. (1998) [52] represents a way of ranking the best
search results based on a page’s reputation. Roughly speaking, PageRank ranks a
page according to how many other pages are pointing at it. This can be described
as a reputation system, because the collection of hyperlinks to a given page can
be seen as public information that can be combined to derive a reputation score.
A single hyperlink to a given web page can be seen as a positive rating of that
web page. Google’s search engine 28 is based on the PageRank algorithm and the
rapidly rising popularity of Google at the cost of Altavista was obviously caused
by the superior search results that the PageRank algorithm delivered.
The definition of PageRank from Page et al. (1998) [52] is given below:
27 http://www.kuro5hin.org/
28 http://www.google.com/
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Definition 4 Let P be a set of hyperlinked web pages and let u and v denote web
pages in P . Let N−(u) denote the set of web pages pointing to u and let N+(v)
denote the set of web pages that v points to. Let E be some vector over P corre-
sponding to a source of rank. Then, the PageRank of a web page u is:
R(u) = cE(u) + c
∑
v∈N−(u)
R(v)
|N+(v)|
(4)
where c is chosen such that ∑u∈P R(u) = 1.
In [52] it is recommended that E be chosen such that ∑u∈P E(u) = 0.15. The
first term cE(u) in Eq.(4) gives rank value based on initial rank. The second term
c
∑
v∈N−(u)
R(v)
|N+(v)|
gives rank value as a function of hyperlinks pointing at u.
According to Def.4 above R ∈ [0, 1], but the PageRank values that Google provides
to the public are scaled to the range [0,10] in increments of 0.25. We will denote
the public PageRank of a page u as PR(u). This public PageRank measure can be
viewed for any web page using Google’s toolbar which is a plug-in to the MS Ex-
plorer browser. Although Google do not specify exactly how the public PageRank
is computed, the source rank vector E can be defined over the root web pages of
all domains weighted by the cost of buying each domain name. Assuming that the
only way to improve a page’s PageRank is to buy domain names, Clausen (2004)
[11] shows that there is a lower bound to the cost of obtaining an arbitrarily good
PR.
Without specifying many details, Google state that the PageRank algorithm they are
using also take other elements into account, with the purpose of making it difficult
or expensive to deliberately influence PageRank.
In order to provide a semantic interpretation of a PageRank value, a hyperlink can
be seen as a positive referral of the page it points to. Negative referrals do not
exist in PageRank so that it is impossible to blacklist web pages with the PageRank
algorithm of Eq.(4) alone. Before Google with it’s PageRank algorithm entered
the search engine market, some webmasters would promote web sites in a spam-
like fashion by filling web pages with large amounts of commonly used search
key words as invisible text or as metadata in order for the page to have a high
probability of being picked up by a search engine no matter what the user searched
for. Although this still can occur, PageRank seems to have reduced that problem
because a high PR is also needed in addition to matching key words in order for a
page to be presented to the user.
PageRank applies the principle of trust transitivity to the extreme because rank
values can flow through looped or arbitrarily long hyperlink chains. Some theoretic
models including [35,38,73] do also allow looped and/or infinite transitivity.
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9.6 Supplier Reputation Systems
Many suppliers and subcontractors have established a web presence in order to get
a broader and more global exposure to potential contract partners. However as de-
scribed in Sec.1 the problem of information asymmetry and uncertainty about sup-
plier reliability can make it risky to establish supply chain and subcontract agree-
ments online. Reputation systems have the potential to alleviate this problem by
providing the basis for making more informed decisions and commitments about
suppliers and subcontractors.
Open Ratings 29 is a company that sells Past Performance reports about supply
chain subcontractors based on ratings provided by past contract partners. Ratings
are provided on a 1-100 scale on the following 9 aspects: Reliability, Cost, Order
Accuracy, Delivery/Timeliness, Quality, Business Relations, Personnel, Customer
Support and Responsiveness and a suppliers score is computed as a function of re-
cently received ratings. The reports also contain the number and business categories
of contract partners that provided the ratings.
9.7 Scientometrics
Scientometrics [25] is the study of measuring research output and impacts thereof
based on the scientific literature. Scientific papers cite each other, and each citation
can be seen as a referral of other scientific papers, their authors and the journals
where the papers are published. The basic principle for ranking scientific papers is
to simply count the number of times each scientific paper has been cited by another
paper, and rank them accordingly. Journals can be ranked in a similar fashion by
summing up citations of all articles published in each journal and rank the journals
accordingly. Similarly to Google’s PageRank algorithm, only positive referrals are
possible with cross citations. This means that papers that, for example, are known
to be plagiarisms or to contain falsified results can not easily be sanctioned with
scientometric methods.
As pointed out by Makino (1998) [43], even though scientometrics normally pro-
vide reasonable indicators of quality and reputation, it can sometimes give mislead-
ing results.
There is an obvious similarity between hyperlinked web pages and literature cross
references, and it would be interesting to apply the concepts of PageRank to scien-
tific cross citations in order to derive a new way of ranking authors and journals.
We do not know of any attempt in this direction.
29 http://openratings.com/
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10 Problems and Proposed Solutions
Numerous problems exist in all practical and academic reputation systems. This
section describes problems that have been identified and some proposed solutions.
10.1 Low Incentive for Providing Rating
Ratings are typically provided after a transaction has taken place, and the transac-
tion partners usually have no direct incentive for providing rating about the other
party. For example when the service provider’s capacity is limited, participants may
not want to share the resource with others and therefore do not want to give refer-
rals about it. Another example is when buyers withhold negative ratings because
they are “nice” or because they fear retaliation from the seller. Even without any of
these specific motives, a rater does not benefit directly from providing a rating. It
serves the community to provide ratings and the potential for free-riding (i.e. letting
the others provide the ratings) therefore exists.
Despite this fact many do provide ratings. In their study, Resnick & Zeckhauser
(2002) [55] found that 60.7% of the buyers and 51.7% of the sellers on eBay pro-
vided ratings about each other. Possible explanations for these relatively high values
can for example be that providing reciprocal ratings simply is an expression of po-
liteness. However lack of incentives for providing ratings is a general problem that
needs special attention and that might require specific incentive mechanisms.
Miller et al. (2003) [47] have proposed a scheme for eliciting honest feedback
based on financial rewards. Jurca & Faltings (2003) [34] have proposed a similar
incentive scheme for providing truthful ratings based on payments.
10.2 Bias Toward Positive Rating
There is often a positive bias when ratings are provided. In Resnick & Zeckhauser
(2002) [55], it was found that only 0.6% of all the ratings provided by buyers and
only 1.6% of all the ratings provided by sellers were negative, which seems too low
to reflect reality. Possible explanations for the positive rating bias are that a positive
ratings simply represents an exchange of courtesies (Resnick & Zeckhauser 2002),
that positive ratings are given in the hope of getting a positive rating in return (Chen
& Singh 2001)[10] or alternatively that negative ratings are avoided because of fear
of retaliation from the other party (Resnick & Zeckhauser 2002). After all, nobody
is likely to be offended by an unfairly positive rating, but badmouthing and unfairly
negative ratings certainly have the potential of provoking retaliation or even a law
suit.
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An obvious method for avoiding positive bias can consist of providing anonymous
reviews. A cryptographic scheme for anonymous ratings is proposed by Ismail et
al. (2003) [27].
10.3 Unfair Ratings
Finding ways to avoid or reduce the influence of unfairly positive or unfairly nega-
tive ratings is a fundamental problem in reputation systems where ratings from oth-
ers are taken into account. This is because the relying party can not control the sin-
cerity of the ratings when they are provided on a subjective basis. Authors propos-
ing methods to counter this problem include [2,5,6,10,12–14,47,64,58,68,69,71].
The methods of avoiding bias from unfair ratings can broadly be grouped into two
categories described below.
10.3.1 Endogenous Discounting of Unfair Ratings
This category covers methods that exclude or give low weight to presumed un-
fair ratings based on analysing and comparing the rating values themselves. The
assumption is that unfair ratings can be recognised by their statistical properties.
Dellarocas (2000) [14] and Withby et al. [68] have proposed two different schemes
for detecting and excluding ratings that are likely to be unfair when judged by
statistical analysis. Chen & Singh (2001) [10] have proposed a scheme that uses
elements from collaborative filtering for grouping raters according to the ratings
they give to the same objects.
10.3.2 Exogenous Discounting of Unfair Ratings
This category covers methods where the externally determined reputation of the
rater is used to determine the weight given to ratings. The assumption is that raters
with low reputation are likely to give unfair ratings and vice versa.
Private information e.g. resulting from personal experience is normally considered
more reliable than public information such as ratings from third parties. If the rely-
ing party has private information, then this information can be compared to public
information in order to give an indication of the reliability of the public informa-
tion.
Buchegger & Le Boudec (2003) [6] have proposed a scheme based on a Bayesian
reputation engine and a deviation test that is used to classify raters as trustworthy
and not trustworthy. Cornelli at al. (2002) [12] have described a reputation scheme
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to be used on top of the Gnutella 30 P2P network. Ekstro¨m & Bjo¨rnson (2002) [16]
have proposed a scheme and built a prototype called TrustBilder for rating subcon-
tractors in the Architecture Engineering Construction (AEC) industry. Yu & Singh
(2003) [71] have proposed to use a variant of the Weighted Majority Algorithm
[41] to determine the weights given to each rater.
10.4 Change of Identities
Reputation systems are based on the assumption that identities and pseudonyms are
long lived, allowing ratings about a particular party from the past to be related to
the same party in the future. In case a party has suffered significant loss of reputa-
tion it might be in his interest to change identity or pseudonym in order to cut with
the past and start from fresh. However, this practice is not in the general interest
of the community [20] and should be prevented or discouraged. Authors proposing
methods to counter this practice include Zacharia, Moukas & Maes (1999) [72].
Their reputation scheme, which we call the ZMM-scheme, was used in the 1996-
1999 MIT based Kasbah multi-agent C2C transaction system. Upon completion of
a transaction, both parties were able to rate how well the other party behaved. The
Kasbah agents used the resulting reputation score when negotiating future trans-
actions. A main goal in the design of the ZMM-scheme was to discourage users
from changing identities, and the ZMM scheme was deliberately designed to pe-
nalise newcomers. This approach has the disadvantage that it can be difficult to
distinguish between good and bad newcomers.
10.5 Quality Variations Over Time
Economic theory indicates that there is a balance between the cost of establishing
a good reputation and the financial benefit of having a good reputation, leading
to an equilibrium [36,62]. Variations in the quality of services or goods can be a
result of deliberate management decisions or uncontrolled factors, and whatever
the cause, the changes in quality will necessarily lead to variations in reputation.
Although a theoretic equilibrium exists, there will always be fluctuations, and it is
possible to characterise the conditions under which oscillations can be avoided [65]
or converge towards the equilibrium [26]. In particular, discounting of the past is
shown to be a condition for convergence towards an equilibrium [26]. Discounting
of the past can be implemented in various ways, and authors use different names
to describe what is basically the same thing. Past ratings can be discounted by a
forgetting factor [31], aging factor [7] or fading factor [6]. Inversely a longevity
factor[30] can be used to determine a rating’s time to live. Yet another way to
30 http://www.gnutella.com
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describe it is by reinforcement learning [64]. The discounting of the past can be a
function of time or of the frequency of transactions, or a combination of both [6].
10.6 Discrimination
Discriminatory behaviour can occur both when providing services and when pro-
viding ratings. A seller can for example provide good quality to all buyers except
one single buyer. Ratings about that particular seller will indicate that he is trustwor-
thy expect for the ratings from the buyer victim. The filtering techniques described
in Sec.10.3.1 will give false positives, i.e. judge the buyer victim to be unfair in
such situations. Only systems that are able to recognise the buyer victim as trust-
worthy, and thereby give weight to his ratings, would be able to handle this situation
well. Some of the techniques described in Sec.10.3.2 would theoretically be able
to protect against this type of discrimination, but no simulations have been done to
prove this.
Discrimination can also take the form of a single rater giving fair ratings except
when dealing with a specific partner. The filtering techniques described in Sec.10.3.1
and Sec.10.3.1 are designed to handle this type of discrimination.
10.7 Ballot Box Stuffing
Ballot stuffing means that more than the legitimate number of ratings are provided.
This problem is closely related to unfair ratings because ballot stuffing usually con-
sists of too many unfair ratings. In traditional voting schemes, such as political
elections, ballot stuffing means that too many votes are cast in favour of a candi-
date, but in online reputation systems, ballot stuffing can also happen with negative
votes. This is a common problem in many online reputation systems described in
Sec.9 and they usually have poor protection against it. Among the commercial and
live reputation systems, eBay’s Feedback forum seems to provide adequate protec-
tion against ballot stuffing, because ratings can only be provided after transactions
completion. Because eBay charges a fee for each transaction ballot stuffing would
be expensive. Epinions’ and Slashdot’s reputation system also provides some de-
gree of protection because only registered members can vote in a controlled way
on the merit of reviews and comments.
11 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this work has been to describe and analyse the state of the art in
trust and reputation systems. Dingledine al. [15] have proposed the following set
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of basic criteria for judging the quality and soundness of reputation computation
engines.
1. Accuracy for long-term performance. The system must reflect the confidence
of a given score. It must also have the capability to distinguish between a new
entity of unknown quality and an entity with poor long-term performance.
2. Weighting toward current behaviour. The system must recognise and reflect
recent trends in entity performance. For example, an entity that has behaved
well for a long time but suddenly goes downhill should be quickly recognised
as untrustworthy.
3. Robustness against attacks. The system should resist attempts of entities to
manipulate reputation scores.
4. Smoothness. Adding any single rating should not influence the score signifi-
cantly.
The criteria (1), (2) and (4) are easily satisfied by most reputation engines except
for the most primitive such as taking a rating score as the sum of positive minus
negative ratings such as in eBays feedback forum. Criterion (3) on the other hand
will probably never be solved completely because there will always be new and
unforeseen attacks for which solutions will have to be found.
The problems of unfair ratings and ballot stuffing are probably the hardest to solve
in any reputation system that is based on subjective ratings from participants, and
large number of researchers are working on this in the academic community. In-
stead of having one solution that works well in all situations there will be multi-
ple techniques with advantages, disadvantages and trade-offs. Lack of incentives
to provide ratings is also a fundamental problem, because there often is no ratio-
nal reason for providing feedback. Among the commercial and online reputation
systems that take ratings from users into account, financial incentives are only pro-
vided by Epinions (hard cash) and BizRate (price discount), all the other web sites
only provide immaterial incentives in the form of status or rank.
Given that reputation systems used in commercial and online applications have se-
rious vulnerabilities, it is obvious that the reliability of these systems sometimes
is questionable. Assuming that reputation systems give unreliable scores, why then
are they used? A possible answer to this question is that in many situations the rep-
utation systems do not need to be robust because their value lies elsewhere. Resnick
& Zeckhauser (2002) [55] consider two explanations in relation to eBays reputa-
tion system: (a) Even though a reputation system is not robust it might serve its
purpose of providing an incentive for good behaviour if the participants think it
works, and (b) even though the system might not work well in the statistical nor-
mative sense, it may function successfully if it swiftly reacts against bad behaviour
(called “stoning”) and if it imposes costs for a participant to get established (called
“label initiation dues”).
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Given that some online reputation systems are far from being robust, it is obvious
that the organisations that run them have a business model that is relatively insen-
sitive to their robustness. It might be that the reputation system serves as a kind
of social network to attract more people to a web site, and if that is the case, then
having simple rules for participating is more important than having strict rules for
controlling participants’ behaviour. Any reputation system with user participation
will depend on how people respond to it, and must therefore be designed with that
in mind. Another explanation is that, from a business perspective, having a reputa-
tion system that is not robust can be desirable if it generally gives a positive bias.
After all, commercial web stores are in the business of selling, and positively biased
ratings are more likely to promote sales than negative ratings.
Whenever the robustness of a reputation system is crucial, the organisation that runs
it should take measures to protect the stability of the system and robustness against
attacks. This can for example be by including routine manual control as part of the
scheme, such as in Epinions’ case when selecting Category Lead reviewers, or in
Slashdot’s case where Slashdot staff are omnipotent moderators. Exceptional man-
ual control will probably always be needed, should the system come under heavy
attack. Another important element is to keep the exact details of the computation
algorithm and how the system is implemented confidential (called “security by ob-
scurity”), such as in the case of Epinions, Slashdot and Google. Ratings are usually
based on subjective judgement, which opens up the Pandora’s box of unfair ratings,
but if ratings can be based on objective criteria it would be much simpler to achieve
high robustness.
The trust and reputation schemes presented in this study cover a wide range of
application and are based on many different types mechanisms, and there is no
single solution that will be suitable in all contexts and applications. When designing
or implementing new systems, it is necessary to consider the constraints and the
type of information that can be used as input ratings.
The rich literature growing around trust and reputation systems for Internet trans-
actions, as well as the implementation of reputation systems in successful com-
mercial application, give a strong indication that this is an important technology.
The commercial and live implementation seems to have settled around relatively
simple schemes, whereas a multitude of different systems with advanced features
are being proposed by the academic community. A general observation is that the
proposals from the academic community so far lack coherence. The systems being
proposed are usually designed from scratch, and only in very few cases are authors
building on proposals by other authors. The period we are in can therefore be seen
as a period of pioneers, and we hope that the near future will bring consolidation
around a set of sound and well recognised principles for building trust and rep-
utation systems, and that these will find their way into practical and commercial
applications.
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